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How do children (and indeed adults) understand the mind? In this paper 
we contrast two accounts. One is the view that the child's early understand- 
ing of mind is an implicit theory analogous to scientific theories, and 
changes in that understanding may be understood as theory changes. The 
second is the view that the child need not really understand the mind, in 
the sense of having some set of beliefs about it. She bypasses conceptual 
understanding by operating a working model of the mind and reading its 
output. Fortunately, the child has such a model easily available, as all 
humans do, namely her own mind. The child's task is to learn how to 
apply this model to predict and explain others' mental states and actions. 
This is accomplished by running simulations on her working model, that 
is observing the output of her own mind, given certain inputs, and then 
applying the results to others. 
The first position has a certain prominence; research on children's under- 
standing of mind has come to be called 'children's theory of mind'. This 
position is linked to certain philosophers of mind such as Churchland 
(1984) and Stich (1983) who characterize ordinary understanding of mind, 
our mentalistic folk psychology, as a theory. It is also part of a recent 
tendency to describe cognitive development as analogous to theory change 
in science (Carey, 1985, 1988; Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder, 1975; Wellman 
& Gelman, 1988; Keil, 1989; Gopnik, 1984, 1988). The second position, in 
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a somewhat different form, has a venerable philosophical tradition, going 
back to Descartes. This is the tradition of emphasizing the special import- 
ance of the first-person case in understanding the mind. More recently 
Gordon and Goldman have advocated a ’simulation theory’ of mind (ST), 
and this position has been taken up in the developmental literature by 
Hams (1991, this issue) and Johnson (1988). 
We do not believe that this is a dispute that can be settled on conceptual 
or u priori grounds. Rather it is a contest between two empirically testable 
hypotheses about the nature of ‘folk psychology‘. We believe that the 
child’s understanding of mind is helpfully construed as a theory, and that 
changes in understanding may be thought of as theory changes. But we 
believe this because such an account provides the best explanation for the 
currently available developmental evidence. 
In spite of the prominence of the ‘theory theory’ (TT), the exact nature 
of such folk psychological theories has rarely been spelt out in much detail, 
and in fact, this is often raised as an objection to this view. What exactly 
are the theoretical entities and laws that are involved in this theory? How 
is it constructed from the available evidence? We will first attempt to 
provide some of this detailed exposition. When the full story is told, we 
believe, a theory theory of early developments is compelling indeed. 
Second, we will argue that a contrasting simulation account fails to fit the 
data in key places and fails more generally to provide as comprehensive 
a view of development. 
1. The Theory Theory 
The question of what distinguishes a theory from other types of conceptual 
schemas is, of course, an enormous and difficult one. Nevertheless, it 
seems to us that there are characteristic features of both theories and 
theory change that can be outlined in very broad and simplified terms. 
Theoretical constructs are abstract entities postulated, or recruited from 
elsewhere, to provide a separate causal-explanatory level of analysis that 
accounts for evidential phenomena. Gravity is not itself two bodies moving 
in relation to one another, it is postulated to explain such phenomena. 
Such theoretical constructs are typically phrased in a vocabulary that is 
quite different from the evidential vocabulary. For example, Kepler’s theory 
of the planets includes ideas about elliptical orbits that are notoriously not 
visible when we look at the stars’ motions in the sky. Theories in biology 
postulate unseen entities, like viruses and bacteria, with distinctive proper- 
ties some of which are implicated in transmission of disease. Theoretical 
constructs need not be definitively unobservable, but they must be appeals 
to a set of entities removed from, and underlying, the evidential pheno- 
mena themselves. They are designed to explain (not merely type and 
generalize) those empirical phenomena. So, one characteristic of theories 
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is their abstractness. They postulate entities and analyses that explain the 
data but are not simply restatements of the data.’ 
Theoretical constructs do not work independently, they work together 
in systems characterized by laws or structure. A second characteristic of 
theories is their coherence. The theoretical entities and terms postulated 
by a theory are closely, ’lawfully’, interrelated with one another. 
The coherence and abstractness of theories together give them a charac- 
teristic explanatory force.* These features of theories also give them a very 
characteristic sort of predictiveness. To put it crudely, we can map a bit 
of evidence on to one part of the theory, grind through the intratheoretic 
relations, come out at a very different place in the theory and then map 
back from that part of the theory to some new piece of evidence. In this 
way, the set of abstract entities encompass a wide range of events, events 
that might not even seem comparable at the evidential level of description. 
A theory not only makes predictions, it makes predictions about a wide 
variety of evidence, including evidence that played no role in the theory’s 
initial construction. Kepler’s account allows one to predict the behavior of 
new celestial objects, moons for example, which were quite unknown at 
the time the theory was formulated. Theories in biology allow us to predict 
that antibiotics will inhibit many bacterial infections, including some, like 
scarlet fever, that present none of the symptoms of an infected wound, or 
some, like Legionnaire’s disease, that were unknown when the theory was 
formulated. They also allow us to predict that such drugs will be useless 
against viral infections, even when the symptoms of the viral infection are 
identical to those of a bacterial one. 
Some of these predictions will be correct, they will accurately predict 
future events described at the evidential level, and will do so in ways that 
n9 mere empirical generalization could capture. Others will be incorrect. 
It is important to be as clear as possible about the way in which we take theoretical 
constructs to be abstract, unobservable, and postulated. We mean abstract in the 
sense of ‘thought of apart from’ observable particularities, we do not mean abstruse 
or merely ideal. By unobservable we mean not obviously a part of the evidential 
phenomena to-be-explained; not that theoretical entities are necessarily incapable of 
being observed in any fashion whatsoever. Thus, we could postulate that genes 
control inherited features such as eye color and height, in order to provide a theoretical 
account, and still fully expect that genes are observable in some fashion. It is simply 
that genes are not directly evident in, observable in, the phenomena of eye color and 
height themselves. Similarly, postulated does not mean conjured out of thin air, it 
means recruited for explanatory purposes from outside the evidential phenomena 
themselves. Thus (natural) selection can be postulated to account for the origin of 
species but at the same time selection can be fully concrete and observable, in the 
realm of human animal breeding for example. It is the recruitment of selection to 
account for natural speciation that is postulational, selection itself is not a mere 
postulated entity. 
On the theory theory, the ages of development are not crucial. In fact we would 
expect to find, as indeed we do, wide variation in the ages at which successive 
theories develop. We would expect to find similar sequences of development, however. 
We will use ages as a rough way of referring to successive theories. 
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Since theories go beyond the evidence, and since theories are never com- 
pletely right, some of their predictions will be falsified. In still other cases 
the theory will make no prediction at all. In fact, the theory may in some 
circumstances have less predictive power than a large set of empirical 
observations. This is because explanatory depth and force do not simply 
equate with predictive accuracy. We can make predictions about events 
without explaining them: Kepler’s theory still leaves many of Tycho Brahe’s 
observations unexplained. The differences in cases of theoretical prediction 
are two-fold. First, a few theoretical entities and laws can lead to a wide 
variety of unexpected predictions. Second, in the case of a theory, predic- 
tion is intimately tied to explanation. 
An additional characteristic of theories, related to this central function 
of explanation, is that they produce interpretations of evidence, not simply 
descriptions of evidence and generalizations about it. Indeed theories 
influence which pieces of evidence we consider salient or important. In 
modem medicine, for example similar sets of symptoms do not necessarily 
yield the same disease diagnosis. An empirical typology of similar symp- 
toms is overriden by deeper more theoretic biological explanations. The 
interpretive effects of theories may be stronger still, it is notoriously true 
that theoretical preconceptions may lead a scientist to dismiss some kinds 
of evidence as simply noise, or the result of methodological failures. Nor 
is this simply prejudice. On the contrary, deciding which evidence to 
ignore is crucial to the effective conduct of a scientific research program. 
All these characteristics of theories ought also to apply to children’s 
understanding of mind, if such understandings are theories of mind. That 
is, such theories should involve appeal to abstract unobservable entities, 
with coherent relations among them. Theories should invoke characteristic 
explanations phrased in terms of these abstract entities and laws. They 
should also lead to characteristic patterns of predictions, including exten- 
sions to new types of evidence and false predictions, not just to more 
empirically accurate prediction. Finally, theories should lead to distinctive 
interpretations of evidence, a child with one theory should interpret even 
fundamental facts and experiences differently than a child with a different 
theory. 
So far we have been talking mostly about the static features of theories, 
the features that might distinguish them from other cognitive structures 
such as typologies or schemas. But a most important thing about theories 
is their defeasibility. Theories are open to defeat via evidence and because 
of this theories change. In fact, a tenet of modem epistemology is that any 
aspect of a theory, even the most central ones, may change. The dynamic 
features of theories, the processes involved in theory formation and change, 
are equally characteristic and perhaps even more important from a develop- 
mental point of view. 
While any very precise specification, any algorithm, for theory change 
may elude us, there are certainly substantive things to be said about how 
it typically takes place. There are characteristic intermediate processes 
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involved in the transition from one theory to another. One particularly 
critical factor is the accumulation of counter-evidence to the theory. The 
initial reaction, as it were, of a theory to counter-evidence may be a kind 
of denial. The interpretive mechanisms of the theory may treat the counter- 
evidence as noise, mess, not worth attending to. At a slightly later stage 
the theory may develop ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses designed to account 
specifically for such counter-evidence. Auxiliary hypotheses may also be 
helpful because they phrase the counter-evidence in the accepted vocabu- 
lary of the earlier theory. Such auxiliary hypotheses, however, often appear, 
over time, to undermine the coherence that is one of a theory’s strengths. 
The theory gets ugly and messy instead of being beautiful and simple. 
A final step requires the availability or formulation of some alternative 
model to the original theory. A theory may limp along for some time under 
the weight of its auxiliary hypotheses if no alternative way of making 
progress is available. But the fertility of the alternative idea itself may 
not be recognized immediately. Initially it may only be applied to the 
problematic cases. We may see only later on that the new idea also provides 
an explanation for the evidence that was explained by the earlier theory, 
The development of the heliocentric theory of the planets provides some 
good examples of these processes. Auxiliary hypotheses involving more 
and more complex arrangements of epicycles were initially invoked to deal 
with counter-evidence. Later heliocentrism was introduced by Copemicus. 
It is worth noting though that Copemicus‘ theory fails to apply the central 
heliocentric idea very widely. In many respects Copemicus’ account is 
more like the Ptolemaic ones, than, say, Tycho Brahe’s account. It includes 
epicycles, for example. Brahe’s account acknowledges many of the flaws 
of the Ptolemaic ones, and uses the idea of heliocentrism to deal with 
them (other planets revolve around the sun which revolves around the 
earth). But Brahe fails to accept the central idea that the earth itself goes 
round the sun. Only with Kepler is there a really coherent heliocentric 
account that deals both with the anomalies and with the earlier data itself. 
We propose that these same dynamic features should be apparent in 
children’s transition from one theory to a later one, and specifically from 
one view of the mind to another. Children should ignore certain kinds of 
counter-evidence initially, then account for them by auxiliary hypotheses, 
then use the new theoretical idea in limited contexts, and only finally 
reorganize their knowledge so that new theoretical entities play a central 
role. 
2. The Child‘s Theories of Mind 
We propose that there is a change from one mentalistic psychological 
theory to another somewhere between 2.2 and around 4.2. The change is 
not a simple all-or-none one, but rather involves a more gradual transition 
from one view of the mind to another. Indeed this change manifests the 
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telltale intermediate processes that are characteristic of theory change. 
Two-year-olds have an early theory that is incorrect in that it does not 
posit the existence of mental representational states, prototypically beliefs. 
In 3-year-olds there is an intermediate phase where children demonstrate 
an understanding of the existence of representational states, at times, but 
only as auxiliary hypotheses. That is children in this phase can acknow- 
ledge that representational states of mind exist, if forced to do so in certain 
ways, but this realization is peripheral to their central explanatory theory. 
In a third phase, beginning around 4, children reorganize their central 
explanatory theory, it becomes properly a belief-desire psychology. Chil- 
dren begin to realize that what the actor thinks-his or her representation 
of the world rather than the world itself-inevitably determines actions. 
2.1 The 2-year-old Theory 
The 2-year-old is clearly a mentalist and not a behaviorist. Indeed, it 
seems unlikely to us that there is ever a time when normal children are 
behaviorists. Even in infancy, children seem to have some notions, how- 
ever vague, of internal states as evidenced in early primary intersubjec- 
tivity (Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978) and imitation (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977; 
Meltzoff & Gopnik, in press) and later, more clearly, in social referencing 
and joint attention behaviors (e.g. Wellman, in press). It seems plausible 
that mentalism is the starting state of psychological knowledge. But such 
primary mentalism, whenever it first appears, does not include all the sorts 
of mental states that we as adults recognize. More specifically, even at two 
years psychological knowledge seems to be structured largely in terms of 
two types of internal states, desires, on the one hand and perceptions, 
on the other. However, this knowledge excludes any understanding of 
representation. 
Desire and perception alone provide examples of the two basic categories 
of explanatory entities in folk psychology-the two types of theoretical 
constructs that Searle calls 'world-to-mind' and 'mind-to-world' states 
(Searle, 1983). An understanding of desire encompasses an early knowledge 
that what's in the mind can change what's in the world. An understanding 
of perception, on the other hand, encompasses an early knowledge that 
what's in the mind depends on what's in the world. Moreover, both desire 
and perception, as theoretical constructs, work to explain action but may 
also be divorced from any particular actions that an agent may perfom. 
Importantly, however, desire and perception can be, and at first are, 
understood in nonrepresentational terms. Desires at first are conceived 
simply as drives towards objects (Wellman & Woolley, 1990). Perceptions 
are at first understood simply as awareness of objects (Flavell, 1988). 
In neither case need the child conceive of a complex propositional or 
representational relationship between these mental states and the world. 
Instead, these very young children seem to treat desire and perception as 
fairly simple causal linhs between the mind and the world. Given that an 
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agent desires an object, the agent will act to obtain it. Given that an object 
is within a viewer’s line of sight, the viewer will see it. These causal 
constructs are simple, but they have considerable predictive power. In 
particular, together they allow the first form of ’the practical syllogism’: ’If 
an agent desires X, and sees it exists, he will do things to get it’. Even 
that form of the practical syllogism is a powerful inferential folk psychologi- 
cal law. It allows children to infer for example, that if John wants a cookie 
and sees one in the cookie jar, he will go there for it. If he doesn’t want 
it, or doesn‘t see it, he won’t. 
2.2 The 3-year-old Theory 
By three, children begin to show signs of a more elaborate mental ontology. 
Given the difficulties of testing children younger than three, the earliest 
emergence of this aspect of the theory is difficult to document. While 2- 
year-olds successes on desire and perception tasks are striking, their fail- 
ures on other tasks are more difficult to interpret. However, natural langu- 
age can provide us with one avenue for exploring these abilities. Before 
three, children make extensive and appropriate use of terms for desire and 
perception (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982). More cognitive mental terms 
(think, know, remember, make-believe, dream) only begin to emerge at 
around the third birthday (Shatz, Wellman & Silber, 1983). 
There is further evidence that at three children begin to have a more 
general notion of belief and also of such representational but ‘not real’ 
mental states as pretenses, dreams, and images ( e g .  Wellman & Estes, 
1986). When these concepts first appear, however, they have an interesting 
character, framed by the child’s larger theory which is still a desire- 
perception theory. This manifests itself in two ways. First, understanding 
of belief appears to be initially modelled on a non-representational under- 
standing, that is modelled on an earlier understanding of desire and 
especially perception. Second, even when the notion of belief, as a rep- 
resentation, appears it first plays little if any role in the child’s explanations 
of behavior. In these respects the child’s first conception of belief seems 
to be a conceptual construction based on reworking earlier theoretical 
constructs. Moreover, even the more advanced representational notion 
initially functions like an auxiliary hypothesis rather than a central theor- 
etical construct. 
To elaborate, 3-year-olds’ first understanding of belief seems like their 
earlier understanding of perception in that it shares something of that 
construct’s nonrepresentational character. Specifically, belief does not at 
first easily encompass a sense of misrepresentation. On this view, belief, 
like perception and desire, involves rather direct causal links between 
objects and believers. This view has variously been called a ‘copy theory’ 
(Wellman, 1990), a ‘Cibsonian theory’ (Astington & Gopnik, 1991a) a 
’situation theory’ (Perner, 1991), or a ’cognitive connection’ (Flavell, 1988) 
theory of belief. The similar idea in all these accounts is that belief contents 
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directly reflect the world. The introduction of a notion of belief promises 
an important additional complexity to the child’s theory of mind. Initially 
however, the notion seems to be quite strongly embedded in the nonrep- 
resentational desire-perception framework of the earlier theory. 
At times, however, at least as the fourth year progresses, 3-year-olds are 
able to recognize the existence of beliefs that clearly misrepresent. They 
can explain already completed, ineffective actions as indicating a false 
belief by the actor and can at times even acknowledge the presence of 
mistaken, wrong beliefs (e.g. Siegal & Beattie, 1991; Moses, 1990). However, 
these same children do not often construe actions as stemming from false 
beliefs. When predicting action they typically, consistently, resistantly act 
as if the actor‘s desire along with the objective facts determine action, 
ignoring a role for false belief in influencing action (e.g. Gopnik & Asting- 
ton, 1988; Pemer, Leekham & Wimmer, 1987; Wellman & Bartsch, 1988). 
Similarly, when asked the contents of person’s belief, they consistently, 
resistantly cite the facts (e.g. Perner et aZ., 1987; Moses & Flavell, 1990). In 
short, when predicting action and when diagnosing belief contents, 3- 
year-olds evidence largely a nonrepresentational desire-perception under- 
standing. 
What about ’non-real’ mental states, such as pretences, dreams, and 
images? There is evidence that children actually have such fictional mental 
states as young as 18 months (e.g. Leslie, 1987). Evidence that they under- 
stand such states, however, is much less clear. By the third birthday, 
however, children have some conceptual knowledge of these aspects of 
mental life (e.g. Wellman & Estes, 1986; Harris, Brown, Mamot, Whittall 
& Harmer, 1991). Moreover, they may distinguish such imaginary or hypo- 
thetical states from the states of desire and perception. However, these 
states appear to play little role in children’s explanation of ordinary 
behavior. More significantly, these states have little causal connection to 
objects (that, in fact, is what is distinctive about them). While children see 
desires as states that modify the world, and perceptions as states that are 
modified by the world, pretenses, images and dreams, on their view, bear 
no causal relation to the world at all. It is possible that postulating these 
states, which are representational but divorced from reality, also plays a 
role in the eventual development of the full representational theory. 
In summary, mental representations exist for 3-year-olds, but only as a 
relatively isolated auxiliary hypothesis necessary to explain certain (to 
them) peripheral mental phenomena-the odd infrequent misrepresen- 
tation and exp!anatorily impotent fictional representations. 
2.3 The 5-year-oid View 
By four or five, children, at least in our culture, have developed a quite 
different view of the mind, one that we have called a ’representational 
model of mind’ (Forguson & Gopnik, 1988). On this view almost all 
psychological functioning is mediated by representations. Desires, percep- 
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tions, beliefs, pretences and images all involve the same fundamental 
structure, a structure sometimes described in terms of propositional atti- 
tudes and propositional contents. These mental states all involve represen- 
tations of reality, rather than realities themselves. In philosophical terms, 
the child’s view of the mind becomes fully ’intentional’. To use Dretske’s 
terminology perceiving becomes perceiving that, and desiring becomes 
desiring that, we might even add, that believing becomes believing that 
(Dretske, 1981). This new view provides a kind of Copernican, or better 
Keplerian, revolution in the child’s view of the mind. In addition to 
distinguishing different types of mental states with different relations to 
a real world of objects, the child sees that all mental life partakes of the 
same representational character. Many characteristics of all mental states, 
such as their diversity, and their tendency to change, can be explained by 
the properties of representations. This newly unified view not only pro- 
vides new predictions, explanations and interpretations; it also provides 
a new view of the very evidence that was accounted for earlier by the 
desire-perception theory. 
3. The Child’s Theory as Theory 
What evidence do we have for thinking that these understandings are 
theoretical in the sense that we have been outlining so far? The following: 
The child’s understanding involves general constructs about the mind 
that go beyond the focal evidential phenomena. These constructs feature 
importantly in explanation. They allow children to make predictions about 
behavior in a wide variety of circumstances, including predictions about 
behavior they have never actually experienced and incorrect predictions. 
Finally, they lead to distinctive interpretations of evidence. 
3.1 Explanations 
Children’s explanations of actions show a characteristic theory-like pattern. 
In open-ended explanation tasks (Bartsch & Wellman, 1989; Wellman & 
Banejee, 1991) children are simply presented an action or reaction (‘Jane 
is looking for her kitty under the piano’) and asked to explain it (‘Why is 
she doing that?’). There are many mental states that might be associated 
with such situations. Yet 3- and 4-year-old children’s answers to such 
open-ended questions are organized around beliefs and desires just as 
adults‘ are (‘she wants the kitty’; ’she thinks it‘s under the piano’). More- 
over, there is a shift in explanatory type between two and five. Two-year- 
olds’ explanations almost always mention desires, but not beliefs. Asked 
why the girl looks for her doll under the bed they will talk about the fact 
that she wants the doll, but not the fact that she believes the doll is there. 
Three-year-olds invoke beliefs and desires, and some threes and most 4- 
and 5-year-olds consistently refer to the representational character of these 
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states, explaining failure in terms of falsity. These same trends can be seen 
in the explanations children give in their spontaneous speech (Bartsch & 
Wellman, 1990). 
3.2 Predictions 
Consider the desire-perception theory. Even that early theory allows chil- 
dren to make a variety of predictions about actions and perceptions, both 
their own and others. For example, they should be able to predict that 
desires may differ, and that, given a desire, an actor will try to fulfil that 
desire. They should know that desires may not be fulfilled. They should 
predict that fulfilled desires will lead to happiness, while unfulfilled desires 
will lead to sadness (Wellman & Woolley, 1990). And there is evidence 
that, in fact, all these kinds of predictions are made by very young children 
(e.g. Wellman & Woolley, 1990; Yuill, 1984; Astington & Gopnik, 1991b). 
Similarly, a child with the desire-perception theory should be able to 
predict the perceptions of others in a wide variety of circumstances, includ- 
ing those in which the perceptions are different from their own. Such very 
early activities as shared attention and social referencing behaviors already 
indicate some capacity to understand the perception of others (Wellman, 
in press). Other aspects of this understanding quickly develop. By 24 these 
Level-1 understandings, as Flavell calls them, are firmly and reliably in 
place (Flavell, 1988). At this age children can reliably predict when an 
agent will or will not see (and hear and touch) an object (e.g. Flavell, 
Everett, Croft & FlaveIl, 1981). They can also predict how seeing an object 
will lead to later actions. However, they are unable to make predictions 
about representational aspects of perception, what Flavell calls Level-2 
understanding. They fail to predict, for example, that an object that is 
clearly seen by both parties can look one way to one viewer and another 
way to another. 
These predictions may seem so transparent to adults that we think of 
them not as predictions at all but simply as empirical facts. A little reflec- 
tion, however, should make us realize that the notion of desire or percep- 
tion used by these very young children is theoretically broad and powerful. 
Children can use the notion of desire appropriately and make the correct 
predictions when the desired objects are objects, or events, or states of 
affairs. They can attribute desires to themselves and others even when 
they do not act to fulfill the desires and when the desires are not in 
fact fulfilled. SimiIarly, children seem to make accurate predictions about 
perception across a wide range of events, involving factors as different as 
screens, blindfolds, and visual angles, and do so across different perceptual 
modalities. Again, they may do so even when the perceptions do not lead to 
any immediate observable actions. Moreover, given novel and unfamiliar 
information about an agent’s desires and perceptions, children will make 
quite accurate predictions about the agent’s actions. 
More significantly, however, these children also make incorrect predic- 
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tions in cases where the desire-perception theory breaks down. Both 
desires and perceptions, on the 2-year-old view, involve simple non- 
representational causal links between the world and the mind. Even the 
early non-representational notions of belief have this quality. This theory 
cannot handle cases of misrepresentation. Presented with such cases it 
makes the wrong predictions. The theory also cannot handle other prob- 
lems that require an understanding of the complexity of the represen- 
tational relations between mind and world. For example, the theory breaks 
down when one must consider the fact that the same belief may come 
from different sources, or that there may be different degrees of certainty 
of beliefs. 
The most well-known instance of such an incorrect prediction is, of 
course, the false-belief error in 3-year-olds (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983; Perner 
et aZ., 1987). The focus on false belief tasks may, however, be somewhat 
unfortunate since it has promoted a mind-set in which any ability to 
perform ‘correctly’ on a false-belief task is taken as evidence that the child 
has a representational theory of the mind. As we will see, there are cases 
in which 3-year-olds indicate some understanding of false belief. However, 
to begin with it is worth pointing out the much greater ubiquity and 
generality of the incorrect false-belief predictions. Three-year-olds make 
erroneous predictions, not only in the ‘classic’ tasks, but also in many 
other cases involving beliefs about location, identity, number and proper- 
ties. They make incorrect predictions for ‘real’ others, for puppets, for 
children, and for hypothetical story characters. Incorrect predictions are 
made when the question is phrased in terms of what the other thinks, 
what the other will say and what the other will do, and across a wide 
range of syntactic frames. They are made by North American (Gopnik & 
Astington, 1988), British (Perner et al., 1987), and Austrian (Wimmer & 
Perner, 1983) children, and recently by Baka children of the Cameroons 
(Avis & Harris, 1991). 
Moreover, and more significantly from the point of view of the theory 
theory, these incorrect belief predictions are mirrored in 3-year-olds’ per- 
formance on a wide range of other tasks. A brief inventory would include 
(a) appearance-reality tasks, which themselves have proved robust across 
many variations of culture, question and material (Flavell, Green & Flavell, 
1986), (b) questions about the sources of belief (Gopnik & Graf, 1988) and 
the understanding of subjective probability (Moore, Pure & Furrow, 1990), 
and (c) the understanding of pictorial representational systems (Zaitchek, 
1990). In some of these tasks the desire-perception theory makes incorrect 
predictions, and children consistently give the same wrong answer. In 
others, it makes no predictions at all and the children respond at random. 
On any information-processing account these tasks would require quite 
different kinds of competences. Moreover, the standard methodology of 
these studies has included control tasks, involving similar or identical 
information-processing demands, which children seem entirely capable of 
answering. Nor do any dimensions of familiarity, at least in any simple 
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terms, seem to underlie the difference between tasks at which children 
succeed and fail. 
3.3 Interpretations 
In these cases children are clearly using belief and desire to make 
predictions-one of the central functions of theoretical constructs. In 
addition to the explanatory and predictive effects, children also show 
strong interpretive effects. Suppose we present the child with counter- 
evidence to the theory? If the child is simply reporting her empirical 
experience we might expect that she will report that evidence correctly. In 
fact, however, children consistently misreport and misinterpret evidence 
when it conflicts with their theoretical preconceptions. Flavell and his 
colleagues have some provocative but simple demonstrations of evidential 
misinterpretation (Flavell, Flavell, Green & Moses, 1990). A child sees a 
blue cup, agrees that it is blue and not white, and sees the cup hidden 
behind a screen. At this point another adult comes into the room, and she 
says ’I cannot see the cup. Hmm, I think it is white’. Then the chiId is 
asked what color he thinks the cup is and what color the adult thinks it 
is. To be correct the child need only report the adult’s actual words, but 
3-year-olds err by attributing to the character a true belief. Even if cor- 
rected, ’well actually she really thinks it’s white’, 3-year olds continue to 
insist the adult has a factually correct belief: ‘She thinks it’s blue’. More- 
over, as we will see, three-year-old children consistently misreport their 
own immediately past mental states. 
3.4 Transitional Phenomena 
In developmental psychology we are often better at describing the states 
at two points in development than at describing changes from one state 
to another. Nevertheless, recent evidence suggests that during the period 
from three to four many children are in a state of transition between the 
two theories, similar, say to the fifty years between the publication of De 
Revolutionibus and Kepler‘s discovery of elliptical orbits. This is rather bad 
luck for developmentalists since this period has been the focus of much 
of our investigation. But it also means that we may have some intriguing 
evidence about the mechanisms that lead from one theory to another. 
We have already seen in our discussion of interpretation how children 
with the earlier theory begin by simply denying the existence of the 
counter-evidence. Johnny and I really did think and act as if there were 
pencils in the box when we first saw it. We have also seen that at around 
three children develop a first non-representational account of belief, which 
extends their original desire-perception psychology. We can also ask where 
the first signs of an understanding of misrepresentation, the centerpiece 
of the 5-year-old theory, begin to appear. Recall that we suggested, in the 
scientific case, that in a transitional period the crucial idea of the new 
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theory may appear as an auxiliary hypothesis couched in the vocabulary 
of the original theory, or be used in order to deal with particularly salient 
types of counter-evidence, but may not be widely applied. There is evi- 
dence for both these phenomena in the period from three to four. Children 
seem to us to initially develop the idea of misrepresentation in familiar 
contexts like those of desire and perception, without extending the idea 
more generally. They also initially apply the idea only when they are 
forced to by counter-evidence. 
There is evidence that by placing the misrepresentation questions in the 
context of the earlier theory we can begin to see (or perhaps, in fact, 
induce) glimmerings of the later theory. Desire and perception may be 
construed either non-representationally, or representationally. In fact, in 
the adult theory, desire and perception are as representational as belief. 
What we want and see (by and large) is not the thing itself but the thing 
as represented. Understanding some aspects of desire and perception 
requires this sort of representational understanding. When we are satiated 
with something we no longer desire it, but the object itself has not 
changed. When different types of people have different tastes or values, 
their desires differ but the objects of desire remain the same (Flavell et al., 
1990). There is evidence that these representational aspects of desire are 
understood earlier than equivalently representational aspects of belief 
(Gopnik & Slaughter, 1991). However, 3-year-old children still do not 
perform as well on these tasks as they do on simple nonrepresentational 
desire tasks. Similarly, while non-representational aspects of perception 
are understood by 24, representational ones, what Flavell calls level-2 
perspective-taking, are only understood later (Flavell et al., 1981; Flavell et 
al., 1986; Masangkay, McCluskey, McIntyre, Sims-Knight, Vaughn & Flav- 
ell, 1974). However, there is evidence that these aspects of perception are 
understood before corresponding aspects of belief. Both in Flavell's earlier 
studies and in a recent study we conducted (Gopnik & Slaughter, 1992), 
children were better at misrepresentation tasks involving perception than 
they were at similar appearance-reality and false-belief tasks. 
We have suggested that for the 2-year-old the central theoretical con- 
structs are non-representational desires and perceptions while for the 5- 
year-old they are representational beliefs. Three-year-old precursors seem 
to include both non-representational accounts of belief and represen- 
tational accounts of desire and perception. This is reminiscent of the way 
that Copemicus and Tycho Brahe mix epicycles and heliocentrism. 
There is also evidence that early signs of an understanding of misrep- 
resentation may come when children are forced to consider counter-evi- 
dence to their theory. In particular, Bartsch and Wellman (1989) found, as 
others had, that 3-year-old children continued to make incorrect false- 
belief predictions even given counter-evidence. However, if children were 
asked to explain the counter-evidence, at least some of them began to talk 
about misrepresentation as a way of doing so. Making the counter-evi- 
dence particularly salient seemed to help to induce the application of the 
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theory in this transitional age group. Similarly, in a recent study, Mitchell 
and Lacohee (in press) found that children in a representational change 
task who selected an explicit physical token of their earlier belief (a picture 
of what they thought was in the box) were better able to avoid later 
misrepresentation of that belief. That is, these children seemed to recognize 
the contradiction between the action they had just performed (picking a 
picture of candies) which was well within the scope of their memory, and 
their theoretical prediction about their past belief. Some evidence from 
natural language may also be relevant. Before age three (or slightly earlier) 
we simply do not find genuine references to belief. At about three, how- 
ever, we begin to see such references, and also to see beginnings of 
contrastive uses of belief terms (Bartsch & Wellman, 1990). These uses may 
occur in contexts in which some particularly salient piece of counter- 
evidence to the earlier theory takes place. During the following year, 
however, the use of these terms increases drastically. 
In short, children seem to first understand both belief and representation 
as small extensions of the original non-representational desire-perception 
theory, essentially as auxiliary hypotheses. This stage appears to be an 
intermediate one between a fully non-representational and a fully rep- 
resentational theory of mental states. 
Do 3-year-olds really understand false belief then? Did Copemicus really 
understand planetary movement? The answer in both cases is that the 
question is a bad one. One of the strengths of the theory theory is that it 
makes such questions otiose. ‘Understanding’ false belief, or developing 
an idea of representation, involves the development of a coherent, widely 
applicable theory. It may be possible to have some elements of that theory, 
or to apply them in some cases, without operating with the full predictive 
power of the theory, particularly in a transitional state. 
We argue therefore, that the transition from 24 to 5 shows all the signs 
of being a theory change. While initially the theory protects itself from 
counter-evidence, the force of such counter-evidence eventually begins to 
push the theory in the direction of change. The first signs of the theory 
shift may emerge when counter-evidence is made Particularly salient. 
Moreover, the theory initially deals with such counter-evidence by making 
relatively small adjustments to concepts that are already well-entrenched, 
such as desire and perception. Finally, by 4 or 5 the new theory has more 
completely taken over from the old. The predictions are widely and readily 
applicable to a range of cases. 
4. Simulation Theory 
In the theory theory, to predict someone’s behavior we have recourse to 
theoretical constructs such as beliefs and desires. Explaining someone’s 
behavior involves more than empirical generalization (X has always done 
this in similar situations in the past). It involves appeal to constructs at a 
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very different level of vocabulary-->( wants Y and believes Z. A distinction 
between a phenomenal description and a theoretical explanation is crucial. 
On the simulation theory, however, the child‘s (and adult’s) understand- 
ing of mind is more closely linked to the phenomenal than to the theoreti- 
cal. Understanding states of mind involves empirically discovering the 
states or results of a model. Consider again an understanding of the 
planets. An appeal to theoretical notions such as heavenly bodies revolving 
around one another can be contrasted to use of a planetarium-model to 
predict the star’s appearance. (Here we want to be careful to focus on a 
user of a planetarium who has no deeper understanding of its workings 
and not focus on the planetarium’s creator, for example, who presumably 
understood something theoretical about planetary motion in order to build 
a successful device.) The user need only see, empirically, that the planet- 
arium’s behavior mimics the stars, then the user can make predictions by 
’running’ the planetarium rather than waiting for the actual events. And 
the user can achieve a sort of explanation, explanation-by-demonstration, 
as well. Let’s say the user experiences a real eclipse for the first time, 
noting that in the middle of the day it very uncharacteristically gets dark, 
although there are no clouds in sight. ’Why?’, he asks himself. Is this a 
breakdown in all his empirical generalizations about the system; is it to 
be expected again; what happened? By running the planetarium under 
appropriate conditions the user can ‘see’ the phenomenon again, see that 
it occurs regularly, in the model; see that it is a natural although infrequent 
empirical fact. If asked by someone else ‘What was that (eclipse)?’ or ‘Why 
did that happen?’ the user can explain-by-demonstrating: ’Look, it (the 
eclipse) was one of these (demonstrate the model’s state). It happens when 
the other stars are like this.’ 
The simulation theory contends that our prediction and explanation of 
mental phenomena is like that of the planetarium user. The child (or 
adult) doesn’t need and doesn’t appeal to a theory of mind, a conceptual 
understanding of mental states, to predict behavior or understand others. 
Instead she simply runs a perfect working model of a mind, her own mind. 
By considering the output of her own mind she can predict the mental 
states and resultant behaviors of others. And to explain curious or unexpec- 
ted actions she can run her model, find a suitable simulated demonstration 
of the phenomena, and then explain it as ’look, it’s one of these’. 
Consider, for example, the classic false-belief task. The child sees a candy 
box, finds out that it is full of pencils, and then is asked what another 
person will think is inside it. Simulation theorists contend that the child 
need not have anything like a theoretical construct of belief (or desire) to 
solve this task. She simply has access to her own first-hand mental system 
and uses that. When asked what the character ’thinks’, she need not 
understand beliefs as something like a representational construct, she 
simply simulates the experience and reports her own specific resulting 
state-‘Oh, I (she) think‘s there is candy in the box’. The earlier failure to 
solve this task, on this view, reflects a failure of simulation, rather than a 
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failure of knowledge. It is not that the younger child fails to understand 
beliefs as states of misrepresentation, as we described it earlier, it is just 
that the younger child makes an egocentric simulation, projecting her own 
current mental states onto the other, rather than adjusting the simulation 
to the other's particular condition. 
The simulation view has a number of telling empirical consequences; 
we will focus on two. The first concerns the centrality of your own mind 
in any understanding of the minds of others. To answer questions about 
others, according to ST, you must conduct a simulation on a model, and 
that model is your own mind. On the simulation view, therefore, the 
outputs of your own mental system are particularly central to all discourse 
about the mind. Moreover, these outputs must be easily and transparently 
accessible. This must be true in order for the simulation account to work 
at all in the case of other people. A presupposition of the account is that 
it is possible to read off and report the output of your own mental states, 
and to use them in explanation, prediction and inference. Moreover, access 
to your own states requires no inference or interpretation, no conceptual 
intermediaries, no theorizing; you simply read them off. A consequence 
of this view is that one cannot erroneously misinterpret, or misconceive, 
one's own mental state. You could of course run a bad simulation, in the 
sense that you entered the wrong inputs. But given those inputs, the 
output must be accurate. It must accurately reflect what your mind would 
actually do in that situation, because it IS what your mind actually does 
in that situation. 
On the theory view, in contrast, erroneous self-interpretations are not 
only possible, they are to be expected. One typical characteristic of theories, 
after all, is that they allow and often even force interpretation of the 
evidence. If the theoretical prediction and evidence are in conflict it is 
often the evidence rather than the theory which is reinterpreted. Equally, 
on the theory theory psychological constructs, such as beliefs and desires, 
are generically applicable to the self or to others. If you possess a faulty 
conception of some mental state, say belief, then you will incorrectly 
attribute that mental state to others, and you should make parallel incorrect 
attributions to yourself. In short on the Simulation Theory false interpret- 
ations of your own mental states should not occur. On the Theory Theory 
such false interpretations should occur whenever your theoretical con- 
structs are faulty. 
A second empirical consequence, related to this first one, concerns how 
development should proceed. For both TT and ST we can predict that there 
will be development: children should first be good at predicting/explaining 
'easy' states and then later 'hard' ones. But the notions of easy and hard 
should differ dramatically between these two theories. For ST the critical 
difference should be between states that are difficult or easy to simulate. 
Presumably, the metric for such ease and difficulty must be intimately 
related to the similarity of the states to the child's own states. In this sense 
the simulation theory is in another long and honorable tradition, the 
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tradition of ‘perspective-taking’ views in development. Several of the 
simulation theorists in this Special Issue for example presume that young 
children‘s errors are ‘egocentric’. That is, the child’s early errors consist of 
not correctly adjusting their simulation to the other person’s condition. 
Note that on this theory there is no reason to expect that different mental 
states should be easier or harder to attribute to others. Take beliefs and 
desires. Both beliefs and desires are equally available to the child as states 
of her own mind. At a young age we could predict that reading off one‘s 
own beliefs and desires should be equally easy, and attributing conflicting 
beliefs and desires to someone else should be equally difficult. 
In contrast, for the theory theory the critical metric concerns states that 
are easy or difficult to conceive of. Earlier we described what we take to 
be a succession of changes in the child’s conceptions of mental states, as the 
child develops and replaces a succession of theories. Especially important is 
a difference between an early non-representational understanding of mind 
and a later more representational understanding. Early on children have a 
relatively adequate understanding of non-representational desire-percep- 
tion states. Later they develop an understanding of the representational 
state of belief, specifically, and a representational understanding of mind 
more generally (including a representational understanding of certain 
aspects of perception and desire). Theoretical conceptions of the sort we 
have described are equally applicable to the self and others. If a theory 
has formulated a particular theoretical construct, such as the concept of 
false representations, it should in principle be able to use this concept 
equally to explain the child’s own behavior and the behavior of others. If 
the theory does not include this construct, it should not be so applicable 
to either the self or others. In short, for the theory theory it will not be SO 
important whether the mental states to be reasoned about are those of self 
or other. What is important is the relevant conceptions of mental states 
that the child must bring to bear. Thus, we find different developmental 
predictions from the two theories. 
We want to describe several empirical findings based on these two main 
issues that tell against the simulation account. (1) Three-year-old children 
make false attributions to themselves, that exactly parallel their false attri- 
butions to others. (2) Three-year-old children make correct non-egocentric 
attributions to themselves and others for some mental states. (3) Children 
refer to only some mental states in their explanations, and refer to different 
mental states at different stages of their development. (4) Children’s under- 
standing of other psxchological phenomena changes in parallel with their 
understanding of false belief. Understanding these phenomena does not 
require simulation, but it does require a representational theory of the 
mind. 
The first set of findings concern children’s ability to understand and 
report their own mental states. For example, children not only fail to 
understand that other’s beliefs can misrepresent; they also fail to under- 
stand that their own beliefs can. In our original experiment (Gopnik & 
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Astington, 1988) we used an analog of the ‘false-belief‘ task. We presented 
children with a variety of deceptive objects, such as the candy box full of 
pencils, and allowed them to discover the true nature of the objects. We 
then asked the children the standard false-belief question, ’What will 
Nkky (another child) think is inside the box?. But we also asked children 
about their own false beliefs about the box: ‘When you first saw the box, 
before we opened it, what did you think was inside it? The pattern of 
results for self and for other was very similar. 3-year-olds tend to say that 
Nicky will think what is true. But they also report that they themselves 
thought what was true, that they had originally thought there were pencils 
in the box. Children’s ability to answer the false-belief question about 
their own belief was significantly correlated to their ability to answer the 
question about the others’ belief, even with age controlIed, a result recently 
replicated by Moore et al. (1990). Children who could not answer the 
question about the other, also could not answer it about themselves. 
The children also received an additional control task. They saw a closed 
container (a toy house) with one object inside it, then the house was 
opened, the object was removed and a different object was placed inside. 
Children were asked ’When you first saw the house, before we opened it, 
what was inside it?‘. This question had the same form as the belief 
question. However, it asked about the past physical state of the house 
rather than asking about a past mental state. Children were only included 
in the experiment if they answered this question correctly, and so demon- 
strated that they could understand that the question referred to the past 
and could remember the past state of affairs. Several different syntactic 
forms of the question were asked to further ensure that the problem was 
not a linguistic one. Recently, this experiment has been replicated, with 
additional controls, by Wimmer and Hart1 (1991). 
In more recent experiments we have investigated whether children could 
understand changes in mental states other than belief (Gopnik & Slaughter, 
1991). A crucial comparison is to desires and perceptions. In three different 
tasks we presented children with situations in which their desires were 
satiated and so changed. For example, initially the child desired one of 
two short books. That one was read to him and the child said he now 
desired the other book. The test question was just like the one for past 
beliefs: ’When you first saw the books, before we read one, which one 
did you want? In these tasks 3-year-old children were considerably better 
at reporting past now-changed desires than past now-changed beliefs. 
Similarly, we presented children with situations in which their perception 
was changed. Children saw an object on one side of a screen and they 
were then moved to the other side of the screen where they saw a different 
object. We asked ’When you first sat on the chair, before we moved over 
here, what did you see on the table?’. Children were completely able to 
report their past perceptions. 
These experiments concern the child’s report of their own mental states, 
beliefs, desires and perceptions. From a simulation point of view, why do 
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the child make errors when they are simply reading off their own mental 
states? And why do they make errors for one state but not the other? 
Perhaps the trouble is that the questions require not a report of current 
mental states, but a memory of past states. Two things need to be kept in 
mind in considering this objection. First, the span of time we are talking 
about is very brief, at the most one or two minutes and often much 
shorter. At least for adults such experiences are well within the immediate 
introspective span. If I were to report the output of my mental system in 
such a situation, I would report the change in my belief that comes with 
the new discovery, with all its attendant phenomenological vividness and 
detail. The very psychological experience of the change in  belief depends 
on the fact that I continue to remember the previous belief. A simulation 
account must presuppose some ability to report immediately past states 
(after all any state will be past by the time it is reported). 
Second, and perhaps more crucially, is the difference between belief and 
other states such as desire and perception. The data suggest that even 
these young children can report some mental states that are just immedi- 
ately past. The poor performance for beliefs therefore cannot be simply a 
problem of poor memory or lost access. This finding presents a paradox 
for simulation accounts. If reporting these immediately past states requires 
simulation, then 3-year-olds are perfectly good simulators of their past 
desires and perceptions: why not beliefs? If reporting past states does not 
require simulation, because these states are just read off, then why do the 
3-year-olds have so much trouble reporting past beliefs? 
In essence, children find some sorts of mental state attributions to be 
difficult and some to be easy. But the difference between the easy and 
hard attributions is not clearly related to the distinction between self and 
other, as expected from ST. The distinction is related to the ability to 
conceive of and interpret some types of mental states and not others, for 
self and for other. From a theory point of view this makes sense. Even 
your own mental states come in several conceptual varieties, such as 
beliefs, desires, and perceptions, and you could be correct at reporting one 
variety and erroneous at another depending on your conceptual under- 
standing of that state. 
A second difficulty concerns whether children are at first generally 
egocentric about the mind and then overcome this by learning they must 
adjust their simulations for others. In Gordon’s terms, is there evidence 
for a stage of early ’total projection’? The developmental data do not fit 
this general mold; there is evidence for non-egocentric understanding 
quite early for some states. We have already described one such task, the 
early ’level-1’ perspective-taking task, in which children can predict that 
the other child will not see what they see themselves. Similarly quite 
young children can predict that someone else will have a desire different 
from their own (Wellman & Woolley, 1990). One issue for simulation 
theory therefore must be to explain why children who can obviously 
‘adjust their simulations’ for some states do not do so for others, say 
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beliefs. Indeed, even for belief itself, the data do not suggest that children’s 
main difficulty involves misattributing their own beliefs to others. Instead, 
it involves a failure to understand that beliefs can misrepresent. 
This is only one example of many results that suggest that young chil- 
dren‘s errors at understanding the mind are not properly termed ‘egocen- 
tric’. Even very young children are quite able to attribute to others mental 
states different from their own. Instead, they err by sometimes misunder- 
standing what certain mental states are really like. 
A third empirical problem is that the simulation theory has difficulty 
explaining the structure of the explanations that children offer. It is com- 
monplace to say that the child’s theory is not, of course, an explicit theory 
but rather an implicit one, which may have to be inferred from behavior 
rather than being openly stated. However, in examining children’s natural 
language and particularly their explanations for aberrant actions, we can 
see many explicit explanatory appeals to beliefs and desires and relations 
between them. One example comes from open-ended explanation tasks. 
In these (Wellman & Bartsch, 1989; Wellman & Banerjee, 1991) children 
are simply presented an action or reaction (’Jane is looking for her kitty 
under the piano’) and asked to explain it (‘Why is she doing that?’). 
Consider a task in which the child is asked to explain why Jane is looking 
for the kitty. In such an actual situation the child herself would be and 
should be experiencing many mental states-a fear that the kitten is lost, 
a creak in her back from bending down, a sensation that it is dark and 
not very visible under the piano, a fear the kitty will scratch, a belief the 
kitty is under there, a desire to find the kitty, a fantasy the kitty is a small 
tiger, and more. Yet children’s answers to such open-ended questions are 
organized predominantly around beliefs and desires just as adults’ are. 
On a simulation account why would the child answer with beliefs and 
desires more than fears and fantasies, pains and sensations or any of a 
vast number of experientially available mental states? On a simulation 
account there is no principled reason for the child to organize mental 
experiences into beliefs and desires and report those appropriately. Other 
empirical categories seem more compelling for categorizing and reporting 
first-hand mental experience (e .g .  pains and sensations). On a theory- 
theory account, in contrast, there is a good reason why such explanations 
predominantly appeal to beliefs and desires. These are the theoretical 
constructs that structure the child’s understanding of mental states. 
More important is the shift in explanatory type between two and five, 
to which we have already referred. Two-year-olds’ explanations almost 
always mention desires, but never beliefs. Asked why the girl looks for 
her doll under the bed they will talk about the fact that she wants the doll, 
but not the fact that she believes the doll is there. Three-year-olds invoke 
beliefs and desires, and some threes and most 4- and 5-year-olds consist- 
ently refer to the representational character of these states, explaining 
failure in terms of falsity. These same trends can be seen in the explanations 
children give in their spontaneous speech (Bartsch & Wellman, 1990). 
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From a ST point of view, the child’s own mind, even at the very youngest 
ages, is a device that itself contains states like beliefs as well as desires. 
The child’s model outputs both beliefs and desires. Why should children’s 
explanations and predictions first privilege desires over beliefs? There is 
no reason to expect this if the child is simply running simulations and 
reporting their outcomes. From TT there is a good reason why children’s 
explanations and predictions at first ignore beliefs and especially false 
beliefs or misrepresentations. Young children have yet to come to a theor- 
etical conception of belief as an explanatory psychological construct. 
A fourth difficulty involves the predictive scope of the simulation theory 
uersus the theory theory. The simulation theory provides a good account 
of one particular type of deficit, perspective-taking difficulties, when they 
occur (although as mentioned earlier ST seems to mischaracterize the 
nature and the developmental progression of egocentric errors). However, 
ST fails to account for other related difficulties. For example, we (Gopnik 
& Graf, 1988) investigated children’s ability to identify the sources of their 
beliefs, elaborating on a question first posed by Wimmer, Hogrefe and 
Pemer (1988). As noted in Goldman’s and Stich and Nichols’ papers, 
there was originally some evidence suggesting that children had difficulty 
understanding how perceptual access leads to knowledge. More recently, 
however, other studies have suggested that children can indeed under- 
stand that people who see an object will know about it, while those who 
do not see the object will not. However, there still appear to be important 
limits on children’s understanding of sources. For example, O’Neill, Flavell 
and Astington (in press) found that three-year-old children could not 
differentiate which source a particular piece of information might come 
from. They claimed for example that someone who had simply felt an 
object would know its color, or someone who had seen an object would 
know its weight. 
In our experiments, we tested children’s understanding of the sources 
of their own beliefs. Children found out about objects that were placed in 
a drawer in one of three ways, either they saw the objects, they were told 
about them, or they figured them out from a simple clue. Then we asked 
’What’s in the drawer?’ and all the children answered correctly. Immedi- 
ately after this question we asked about the source of the child’s knowledge 
‘How do you know there‘s an x in the drawer? Did you see it, did I tell 
you about it, or did you figure it out from a clue?’. Again three-year-olds 
made frequent errors on this task. While they knew what the objects were, 
they could not say how they knew. They might say, for example, that we 
had told them about an object when they had actually seen it. Their 
performance was at better than chance levels, but was still significantly 
worse than the performance of four-year-olds, who were near ceiling. In 
a follow-up experiment (O’Neill & Gopnik, 1991) we added a condition 
with different and simpler source contrasts (tell, see and feel) and presented 
children with only two alternative possibilities at a time. We also included 
a control task which ensured that the children understood the meaning of 
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’tell’, ‘see’ and ’feel’. Despite these simplifications of the task, the perform- 
ance of the three-year-olds was similar to their performance in the original 
experiment. These experiments provide another striking example of the 
child’s failure to accurately report his own mental states when they conflict 
with his theoretical preconceptions, and of the parallels between attri- 
butions to the self and to others. 
Similarly, there is evidence for deficits in children’s understanding of 
subjective probability. Moore et al. (1990) found that three-year-olds were 
unable to determine that a person who knew about an object was a more 
reliable source of information than one who merely guessed or thought. 
Similarly, three-year-olds, in contrast to four-year-olds, showed no prefer- 
ence for getting information from someone who was certain they knew 
what was in a box rather than someone who expressed uncertainty about 
their knowledge. These children seemed to divide cognitive states into full 
knowledge or total ignorance, they did not appreciate that belief could 
admit of degrees. 
We believe that understanding sources and subjective probability is 
difficult for young children because these notions involve an understand- 
ing of the causal structure of the representational system. These aspects of 
the mind are not particularly different for the child and the other. However, 
they do require a complex causal account of the origins of beliefs. This 
account is at the heart of the causal-explanatory framework that eventually 
allows children to fully understand the representational character of the 
mind. These tasks should be difficult if children have not yet worked out 
a representational theory of mind, as we suggest, and thus should be 
related in development to false-belief errors. ST offers no explanation for 
their appearance or their relation to false-belief errors. Understanding 
sources and subjective probability does not seem to require complex 
simulation abilities, especially not when the child’s own states are being 
reported. 
In sum, the developmental pattern of children’s errors and accuracies is 
not consistent with the view that the outputs of your own mind are simply 
and directly accessible, and that these outputs are attributed to others 
through a process of simulation. If such an account were correct, children‘s 
errors should differ between self and other in some clear fashion over 
development. Instead the errors divide between certain theoretical constru- 
als of inner mental states, such as beliefs versus desires, for both the self 
and the other. The child’s understanding of mind is filtered through a 
coherent conceptual understanding of the mind; a theory. The theory 
organizes their interpretation of the phenomena of mental life and provides 
a causal-explanatory understanding of how the world informs the mind 
and mind guides behavior. 
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5. Precocity and Theory Formation 
We would like to end by considering an argument that Gordon, Goldman, 
and Stich and Nichols share. This is the claim that children’s folk psycho- 
logical abilities are intellectually precocious. Children could not develop 
an elaborate psychological theory in a mere three or four years. Gordon 
and Goldman use this as an argument for simulation; children need not 
develop a theory of the mind, they only need to develop a mind, and run 
simulations on it. Stich and Nichols reply that this is an indication that 
important aspects of the theory are innate. We think the assumptions 
behind both of these arguments are ill-founded. In particular they rest on 
the idea that we have some a priori way of measuring the temporal course 
of conceptual change, of saying what is slow or fast or easy or difficult. 
Even in the case of scientific theory change, this seems a dubious claim. 
How long does it take to make a theory? If we measure change sociologi- 
cally it may, of course, take years or even centuries. But how long does an 
individual theory change take? How long did Kepler take to formulate the 
heliocentric theory? How long does it take a current-day student immersed 
in a culture that has assimilated heliocentrism to appreciate and internalize 
it? Days, weeks, months? 
Claiming that three or four years is insufficient time for substantial 
theory development seems even more dubious when we consider the 
general cognitive achievements of young children. Developing a theory of 
mind is indeed an impressive achievement, but it may seem less unique 
if one considers parallel developments in a variety of domains. While there 
may be innate abilities that play a role in these achievements, there is 
much evidence that a great deal of abstract and complex knowledge is also 
learned in this period. For example, no matter how powerful the universal 
constraints on grammar may be, there is still an enormous amount of 
language-specific structure that varies sharply from one language to 
another. Young children quickly master these language-specific principles 
as well as manifesting mastery of universals (Slobin, 1981; Maratsos, 1983). 
More relevantly to the present case, children acquire large amounts of 
physical knowledge in this period. While some aspects of children’s ’folk 
physics’ are innately given, others, such as their appreciation of gravity 
and support, appear to be learned in months or weeks, even during infancy 
itself (Spelke, 1991). By four or five children also seem to have an initial 
understanding of biological kinds. They recognize, for example, that mem- 
bership in such a kind depends on an animal‘s internal state, and even 
on its reproductive potential (Gelman & Coley, 1992). 
These achievements are certainly impressive. But as we consider them 
it is well to remember the general intensity of the child’s cognitive life. 
Naturalistic language data, for example, suggest that the three-year-old 
child may be working on the theory of mind virtually all his waking hours. 
And quite possibly many of his sleeping ones as well. Who knows what 
adults could accomplish in three years of similarly concentrated intellectual 
labor? 
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It is certainly true that there are some innately given kinds of psychologi- 
cal knowledge. However, it seems to us that these are most likely to be 
'starting state' theories, initial conceptions of the mind that are themselves 
subject to radical revision in the face of evidence. They do not function as 
constraints on the final possibilities, in the way that, say, a Chomskyan 
account would propose. Moreover, it seems very unlikely that we can 
determine, a priori, which aspects of psychological knowledge are likely to 
be innate and which are likely to be learned. Children, for example, seem 
to start out as mentalists, though they must learn to be representationalists. 
The evidence of developmental psychology, and indeed the evidence of 
common observation, suggests that young children have learning capacit- 
ies (and we would claim theory formation abilities) far in excess of any- 
thing we might imagine in our daily cognitively stodgy experience as 
adults. Indeed we would say, not that children are little scientists but that 
scientists are big, and relatively slow, children. The historical progress of 
science is based on cognitive abilities that are first seen in very young 
children. 
We might end by telling an evolutionary just-so story to this effect. The 
long immaturity of human children is a notable and distinctive feature of 
human beings. It seems plausible that the cognitive plasticity that is also 
characteristic of human beings is related to this immaturity. Human 
beings, unlike other species, have unique cognitive capacities to adjust 
their behavior to what they find out about the world. A long period of 
protected immaturity, the story might go, plus powerful theory-formation 
abilities, enable children to learn about the specific cultural and physical 
features of their world. These capacities typically go into abeyance once 
ordinary adults have learned most of what they need to know. Still, their 
continued existence makes specialized scientific investigation possible. 
Science, on this view, might be a sort of spandrel, parasitic on cognitive 
development itself. Young children may not only really be theorizers, they 
may well be better ones than we are. 
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